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In the Gaussian-modulated coherent state quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the sender
first generates Gaussian distributed random numbers and then encodes them on weak laser pulses ac-
tively by performing amplitude and phase modulations. Recently, an equivalent passive QKD scheme
was proposed by exploring the intrinsic field fluctuations of a thermal source [B. Qi, P. G. Evans, and
W. P. Grice, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012317 (2018)]. This passive QKD scheme is especially appealing
for chip-scale implementation since no active modulation is required. In this paper, we conduct an
experimental study of the passively encoded QKD scheme using an off-the-shelf amplified sponta-
neous emission source operated in continuous-wave mode. Our results show that the excess noise
introduced by the passive state preparation scheme can be effectively suppressed by applying optical
attenuation and secure key can be generated over metro-area distances. a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote
users (Alice and Bob) to establish a secure key by trans-
mitting quantum states through an untrusted channel
[1–4]. The generated secure key can be further applied
in various cryptographic protocols to achieve long-term
proven security against adversaries with unlimited com-
putational power.
QKD protocols are commonly divided into two families
based on encoding schemes: discrete-variable (DV) QKD
or continuous-variable (CV) QKD. In contrast, classical
optical communications are typically grouped into two
categories based on detection schemes: direct detection
or coherent detection. In principle, combining both en-
coding (DV or CV) and detection (direct or coherent)
could lead to four families of QKD protocols. Among
them, DV-QKD with direction detection (single photon
detection) [5, 6] and CV-QKD with coherent detection
(optical homodyne detection) [7–9] are dominant, al-
though other protocols, such as CV-QKD using single
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photon detection [10], do exist. For simplicity, in this
paper we use the term CV-QKD to refer to CV-QKD
using coherent detection.
CV-QKD’s most distinguishing feature is coherent de-
tection. It enables high speed optical homodyne detec-
tion with no dead time which could give high secure key
rates over short distances. Further, the intrinsic filtering
provided by the local oscillator in a coherent receiver can
effectively suppress background noise and enable QKD
through conventional dense wavelength division multi-
plexed fiber networks in the presence of strong classi-
cal traffic [11–13]. The similarity between a CV-QKD
system and a classical coherent communication system
opens the door for simultaneous quantum and classical
communications [14] with a technological pathway to-
wards fully integrated, on-chip, photonic implementation
[15]. Integrating CV-QKD on a chip may have several
benefits. It allows for the integration of multiple pho-
tonic functions into a single compact circuit. In partic-
ular, the phase-sensitive optical circuits commonly used
for CV-QKD can be made more robust to temperature-
induced phase drifts by reducing path-length differences
on chip. Furthermore, silicon photonic devices are com-
patible with complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
(CMOS) processes that enable monolithic integration of
electronics and photonics, potentially leading to signifi-
cant cost reduction which would enable the wide-spread
utilization of QKD.
One important CV-QKD protocol is the Gaussian-
modulated coherent states (GMCS) QKD protocol [9],
which has been implemented with standard off-the-shelf
telecom components, such as laser sources, optical homo-
dyne detectors, and optical intensity and phase modula-
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2tors [16–20]. In the GMCS protocol, Alice first generates
Gaussian distributed random numbers xA and pA and
then prepares a coherent state |xA + ipA〉 sent to Bob
through a channel controlled by the adversary (Eve). The
quantum state preparation is commonly implemented
actively using amplitude and phase modulation. High
speed modulation with high extinction is extremely chal-
lenging in chip-scale silicon photonics. While on-chip
modulation with extinction ratio above 65 dB has been
demonstrated recently [21], the high speed on-chip mod-
ulators required for active QKD encoding adds signifi-
cant cost, manufacturing time and complexity, and are
the principal source of loss in most integrated photonic
circuits. Therefore, the potential to remove the modula-
tors used for encoding may yield significant reductions in
cost, manufacturing time, and on-chip loss.
One could simplify the chip-scale implementation by
adopting a passive CV-QKD protocol, where the ampli-
tude and phase modulators in the GMCS QKD are re-
placed by a thermal source, beam splitters, optical atten-
uators and homodyne detectors [22]. As we have shown
in [22], given that Alice’s QKD transmitter is trusted, the
passive CV-QKD protocol is equivalent to GMCS QKD.
This means that the well-established security proofs for
GMCS QKD can be applied to passive CV-QKD directly.
More recently, this passive state preparation scheme has
also been extended to measurement-device-independent
CV-QKD [23]. It could also be applied in other CV quan-
tum communication protocols, such as quantum secret
sharing [24] and quantum digital signatures [25].
In this paper, we conduct experimental studies of
passive CV-QKD using a practical multi-mode thermal
source. As we will show below, the excess noise due to the
passive state preparation scheme can be effectively sup-
pressed by Alice applying optical attenuation and, secure
key can be generated over metro-area distances using an
off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emission source oper-
ated in continuous-wave (cw) mode.
This paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we re-
view the passive CV-QKD protocol and compare it with
conventional GMCS QKD [9, 26] as well as entanglement-
based CV-QKD using a two-mode squeezed vacuum state
[27]. In Sec. III, we present our experimental setup and
develop a corresponding noise model. In Sec. IV, we
present the experimental results. Finally, we conclude
this paper with a brief summary in Sec. V.
II. THE PROTOCOL AND ITS SECURITY
In the GMCS QKD protocol [9], Alice generates Gaus-
sian distributed random numbers xA and pA using a
trusted random number generator, prepares a coherent
state |xA + ipA〉 accordingly, and transmits it to Bob,
as shown in Fig. 1(a). At Bob’s end, he can either
measure a randomly chosen quadrature of the incoming
quantum state by conducting single homodyne detection
[9] or measure both quadratures simultaneously by con-
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FIG. 1: Three equivalent quantum state preparation
schemes. (a) The Gaussian-modulated coherent states
(GMCS) QKD [9]. TRNG, true random number
generator; A&P mod., amplitude and phase
modulators. (b) Entanglement-based CV-QKD [27].
TMSV, two-mode squeezed vacuum state; HOM,
homodyne detector; BS, beam splitter. (c) Passive
CV-QKD [22]. Att., optical attenuator.
ducting conjugate homodyne detection (which is called
the heterodyne protocol) [26]. Alice and Bob further es-
timate channel-induced noise and other QKD parameters
by comparing a subset of their data through an authenti-
cated classical channel. This allows them to upper bound
the information that could be gained by a third party
Eve. Given the correlation between Alice and Bob’s data
is above certain threshold, they can perform reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification to generate a final secure
key.
There are different reconciliation algorithms in GMCS
QKD. In this paper, we consider the heterodyne protocol
[26] using reverse reconciliation [9] where Alice tries to
determine Bob’s measurement results from her data. In
this case, secure key can be generated as long as the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob is larger than the
information Eve could have on Bob’s measurement re-
sults. More details about the GMCS QKD can be found
in recent reviews [28, 29].
Note from Eve’s point of view, the quantum state from
Alice is a mixture of all possible coherent states, which
3is simply a thermal state with an average photon num-
ber n0 = VA/2, where VA is Alice’s modulation variance.
We remark that throughout this paper, all the noise vari-
ances and modulation variances are defined in shot-noise
units. There are different ways (corresponding to dif-
ferent QKD protocols) for Alice to prepare the outgoing
thermal state, as shown in Fig. 1. As long as Alice’s
QKD transmitter is within a trusted location, Eve cannot
tell which protocol is actually carried out by Alice. This
suggests all these QKD protocols are equivalent in terms
of security. In fact, the security of the GMCS QKD is
commonly analyzed based on an entanglement-based CV-
QKD protocol using a two-mode squeezed vacuum state
[27], as shown in Fig. 1(b). In this entanglement-based
protocol, by performing conjugate homodyne detection
on one mode of a properly chosen two-mode squeezed
vacuum state, Alice acquires Gaussian distributed ran-
dom numbers xA and pA with the desired variance of
VA. In the meantime, Alice transmits the other mode,
which is projected to a coherent state |xA + ipA〉, in her
perspective, to Bob through the quantum channel. From
Eve’s point of view, since she has no information about
xA and pA, the state from Alice is thermal, as in the case
of GMCS QKD.
In passive CV-QKD [22], the intrinsic field fluctuations
of a thermal source are utilized to generate secure key,
as shown in Fig. 1(c). In this protocol, Alice splits
the output of a thermal source into two spatial modes
using a beam splitter. One mode is sent to Bob after
being attenuated using an optical attenuator, while the
other mode will be measured locally by Alice using con-
jugate homodyne detection. Alice further numerically
scales down her measurement results by a factor of αA
acquiring Gaussian-distributed random numbers xA and
pA, her estimation of the quadrature values of the out-
going mode (see Section III for the details about how to
determine the optimal αA). By choosing a proper com-
bination of source intensity and optical attenuation, the
quadrature variance of the outgoing mode can be set to
the desired value VA. Again, from Eve’s point of view,
she cannot distinguish the quantum state sent in pas-
sive CV-QKD from the one in the GMCS QKD (or, for
that matter, entanglement-based CV-QKD), so all three
protocols are equivalent in terms of security. We remark
that the combination of the balanced beam splitter and
the optical attenuator in Fig. 1(c) can be replaced by
a single unbalanced beam splitter with a suitable split-
ting ratio. The latter configuration can lead to a more
efficient use of the thermal source.
While the security is not dependent on which of the
above schemes is employed, the secure key rate is sensi-
tive to the excess noise generated in the quantum state
preparation process. Since the quantum states sent by
Alice are identical in the three schemes, so is the infor-
mation Eve could gain on Bob’s measurement results.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob directly
connects to Alice’s uncertainties on the quadrature val-
ues of the outgoing mode. In GMCS QKD (and the
above entanglement-based CV-QKD), the minimum un-
certainty Alice could achieve on either quadrature of the
outgoing mode is equal to one, as determined by the un-
certainty principle in quantum mechanics. In Appendix
A, we present a detailed noise model of the passive CV-
QKD protocol and show that Alice’s uncertainty on the
outgoing mode is given by
∆ =
2VA(υa + 1)
VAηa + 2η0(υa + 1)
η0 + 1, (1)
where η0 is the transmittance of the optical attenuator,
ηa and υa are the efficiency and noise variance of Alice’s
detector, respectively. See Eq. (A5) in Appendix A.
From Eq. (1), the excess noise due to the passive state
preparation scheme (which equals ∆ − 1) can be effec-
tively suppressed by introducing optical attenuation at
Alice (while keeping VA at the desired value). Equa-
tion (1) suggests that regardless of the amount of de-
tector noise, as η0 approaches zero, so does the excess
noise. In practice, this is convenient, since Alice’s de-
tector does not need to be shot-noise limited. To further
illustrate the role of the optical attenuation, in Appendix
A, we explicitly show that under the beam-splitting at-
tack, the information advantage between Alice and Bob,
when compared to that between Eve and Bob, can be
improved by introducing optical loss at Alice.
In practice, η0 cannot be zero, otherwise, to have non-
zero average photon number in the outgoing mode, the
intensity of the thermal source has to be infinite. Secu-
rity proofs of practical CV-QKD, taking into account the
excess noise contributed by both Alice and Bob, are well
developed [28, 29]. In next section, we will present our
experimental setup, develop a corresponding noise model,
and quantify the QKD performance using the established
security proof.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND NOISE
MODEL
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2. A fiber
amplifier (PriTel, Inc.) operated in cw mode (Ampli-
fied Spontaneous Emission: ASE in Fig. 2) with vacuum
state input is employed as a broadband thermal source.
Previous studies have shown that the output from an un-
seeded fiber amplifier is thermal [22, 32–34]. To select a
single polarization mode, a fiber pigtailed polarizer (Pol
in Fig. 2) is placed right after the light source. Since the
spectral bandwidth of the source is about 30 nm, a 0.8
nm optical bandpass filter centered at 1542 nm (BP in
Fig. 2) is employed to reduce the optical power of unused
light. Note that the actual bandwidth of this filter is not
crucial since the optical coherent detection is mode se-
lective: only photons in the same spectral-temporal and
polarization mode as the local oscillator will be detected.
Nevertheless, the optical power of unused modes should
be suppressed so that they are well below the power of
the local oscillator.
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup. ASE, broadband amplified
spontaneous emission source; L, narrow-band laser
source as local oscillator; BP, optical band pass filter;
BS, balanced beam splitter; Pol, fiber polarizer;
Att1/Att2, variable optical attenuator; 90o OH,
90-degree optical hybrid; BD, balanced photodetector.
The filtered thermal light is split by a balanced beam
splitter into two modes: one is sent to Bob after passing
through an optical attenuator while the other is mea-
sured locally by Alice using conjugate homodyne detec-
tion. Note that there are two optical attenuators shown
in Fig. 2: Att1 represents a “trusted” attenuator inside
Alice’s system which cannot be controlled by Eve. It
provides the desired attenuation η0 shown in Eq. (1);
Att2 represents the channel loss which is fully controlled
by Eve. In this proof-of-principle experiment, a single
optical attenuator is employed to provide the combined
attenuation of Att1 and Att2.
A cw laser source with a central wavelength of 1542nm
(Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wavelength Reference) is
employed to provide local oscillators for both Alice’s and
Bob’s conjugate homodyne detection systems. For long
distance applications, instead of transmitting a local os-
cillator from Alice to Bob, it is more appropriate to gen-
erate Bob’s local oscillator locally [35–37]. The conjugate
homodyne detection is implemented using a 90-degree op-
tical hybrid and two balanced photodetectors. Limited
by the detectors available, different types of balanced
photodetectors are employed in Alice’s and Bob’s sys-
tems. The corresponding bandwidths are 100MHz (Al-
ice) and 75MHz (Bob). The outputs of all the balanced
photodetectors are sampled by a real time oscilloscope.
One important deviation of the setup shown in Fig. 2
from the ideal passive QKD protocol discussed in the pre-
vious Section is that a multi-mode (rather than a single
mode) thermal source is employed in the actual experi-
ment. On one hand, this modification greatly simplifies
the implementation since it is experimentally challeng-
ing to prepare a single mode thermal state; on the other
hand, the existence of unused modes could contribute
additional noise, as we will discuss below.
Within the integration time of the homodyne detec-
tor, the output of the light source (even after the 0.8nm
spectral filter) contains many spectral-temporal modes
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FIG. 3: Noise model of the experimental setup. S,
thermal source; BS1−3, balanced beam splitter; Att,
optical attenuator; HD, homodyne detector; T, a beam
splitter emulating channel loss; ηax, ηbx, ηap, ηbp, beam
splitters emulating losses of homodyne detectors.
of independent thermal states. To generate correlated
keys, Alice and Bob have to measure the same mode. In
practice, the modes measured by Alice and Bob (which
are determined by the modes of their local oscillators)
may not be perfectly overlapped. We define the mode
measured by Bob as mode |B〉. The mode measured by
Alice may be decomposed as
|A〉 = a|B〉+ b|B′〉 (2)
where |B′〉 represents the mode orthogonal to mode |B〉,
and |a|2+ |b|2 = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
the mode overlap coefficient a is a real number.
For simplicity, we only consider the X-quadrature be-
low. The P-quadrature can be studied in a similar way.
The X-quadrature of the outgoing mode (see Fig. 3) is
given by
x1 =
√
η0
2
xin −
√
η0
2
xv1 −
√
1− η0xv3, (3)
where xin is the X-quadrature of mode |B〉 of the source,
η0 is the transmittance of the optical attenuator, xv1 and
xv3 represent vacuum noises introduced by beam splitter
one and the optical attenuator, respectively.
Similarly, Alice’s measurement result of the X-
quadrature is given by
x2 =
√
ηax
2
(axin + bx
′
in) +
√
ηax
2
(axv1 + bx
′
v1)
+
√
ηax
2
xv2 −
√
1− ηaxxva + Eax,
(4)
where ηax and Eax are the efficiency and noise of Alice’s
homodyne detector for X-quadrature measurement; x′in
is the X-quadrature of mode |B′〉 of the source; x′v1 is the
vacuum noise in mode |B′〉 from beam splitter one; xv2
and xva are vacuum noises associated with beam splitter
two and ηax.
5Given x2, Alice’s optimal estimation of x1 is
xopt = αAx2, (5)
where αA = 〈x1x2〉/〈x22〉 [30, 31].
Using Eqs. (3) and (4), we can determine αA as
αA =
n0a
√
2η0ηax
n0ηax + 2υax + 2
, (6)
where n0 is the average photon number per mode from
the source and υax = 〈E2ax〉 is the detector noise variance.
The relation 〈x2in〉 = 〈(x′in)2〉 = 2n0 + 1, which is a good
approximation for the broadband light source used in our
experiment, has been used in the above derivation.
Using Eqs. (3) to (6), Alice’s uncertainty on x1 given
her measurement result of x2 can be determined as
Vx1|x2 = 〈(x1 − αAx2)2〉 =
2VAη0(υax + 1) + V
2
Aηax(1− a2)
VAηax + 2η0(υax + 1)
+ 1,
(7)
where VA = η0n0 is the equivalent modulation variance
of the outgoing mode.
The excess noise due to the passive state preparation
scheme is εA = Vx1|x2−1, which can be determined from
Eq. (7) as
εA =
2VAη0(υax + 1) + V
2
Aηax(1− a2)
VAηax + 2η0(υax + 1)
. (8)
Once the QKD excess noise has been appropriately
quantified, we can apply the standard security proof for
GMCS QKD to calculate the secure key rate. In next
section, we will experimentally determine the mode mis-
match a and other system parameters to evaluate the
performance of our system.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiment, both the broadband light source
and the local oscillator are operated in cw mode. A 2GHz
bandwidth real time oscilloscope is employed to sample
the outputs of Alice and Bob’s detectors. The modes
sampled by Alice and Bob are determined by lengths of
optical paths and also the electrical frequency responses
of the optical homodyne detectors. Due to experimen-
tal imperfections, the modes measured by Alice and Bob
are not perfectly overlapped, i.e., a < 1. To determine
a, we calculate the correlation between Alice and Bob’s
measurement results at different output photon numbers.
Alice’s X-quadrature measurement result, x2, is given
by Eq. (4). Similarly, when no optical attenuation is
applied (η0 = 1, T = 1, see Fig. 3), Bob’s X-quadrature
measurement result, x3, is given by
x3 =
√
ηbx
2
xin −
√
ηbx
2
xv1
+
√
ηbx
2
xv5 −
√
1− ηbxxvb + Ebx,
(9)
FIG. 4: Raw data of Alice and Bob’s X-quadrature
measurement results (n0=880 and no optical
attenuation applied).
where ηbx and Ebx are the efficiency and noise of Bob’s
homodyne detector for X-quadrature measurement; xv5
and xvb are vacuum noises associated with beam splitter
3 and ηbx (see Fig. 3).
Using Eqs. (4) and (9), it is easy to show
〈x22〉 =
ηax
2
n0 + υax + 1, (10)
〈x23〉 =
ηbx
2
n0 + υbx + 1, (11)
〈x2x3〉 =
√
ηaxηbx
2
n0a. (12)
From Eqs. (10)-(12), the correlation coefficient be-
tween x2 and x3 is given by
Corr =
〈x2x3〉√
〈x22〉〈x23〉
=
n0
√
ηaxηbx√
(ηaxn0 + 2υax + 2)(ηbxn0 + 2υbx + 2)
a.
(13)
Eq. (13) shows that as n0 approaches infinity, the cor-
relation coefficient approaches the mode overlap coeffi-
cient a. Thus, we can determine a experimentally by
measuring the correlation between Alice and Bob’s mea-
surement results at high output photon number.
We adjust n0 by changing the pump power of the fiber
amplifier and calculate the correlation coefficient from
experimental data. In this experiment, no optical atten-
tion is applied (ηtot = η0T = 1). The local oscillator
power is 2mW. The detection efficiency and noise vari-
ance of Alice and Bob’s conjugate homodyne detectors
6FIG. 5: The correlation coefficient of Alice and Bob’s
X-quadrature measurement results at different output
photon numbers of the light source. Blue dots represent
experimental results (error bars represent one standard
deviation). The red line is a fitting curve using Eq. (13)
with a = 0.96.
are ηax = 0.43±0.01, ηap = 0.38±0.01, ηbx = 0.54±0.01,
ηbp = 0.51 ± 0.01, υax = 0.17 ± 0.01, υap = 0.19 ± 0.01,
υbx = 0.24± 0.01,and υap = 0.23± 0.01. At each photon
level, we collect 500,000 data samples, which are further
divided into ten 50,000 data sets. The correlation coeffi-
cient is calculated for each data set.
Figure 4 shows the raw data of Alice and Bob’s X-
quadrature measurement results when the average pho-
ton number per mode from the source is n0 = 880. Fig.
5 shows the correlation coefficient of Alice and Bob’s
X-quadrature measurement results at different n0 (error
bars represent one standard deviation). The red line is
a curve fit using Eq. (13) with a = 0.96 and detector
parameters given above. The theory and experimental
results match well.
To further justify the above noise model, we conduct
experiments using a constant n0 of 900 and different op-
tical attenuation ηtot. This experiment can also be mod-
eled using Eq. (13), with ηbx replaced by ηtotηbx. Note
that when the optical loss is very high, the correlation
between Alice and Bob’s data is barely visible from the
raw data, as evidenced by the case of ηtot = −42.2dB
shown in Fig. 6. Nevertheless, by calculating the cor-
relation coefficient from the raw data and comparing it
with the theoretical prediction, the proposed noise model
is well justified, as shown in Fig. 7.
As we have shown in [22], the well-established security
proof of GMCS QKD can be applied to passive CV-QKD,
as long as the excess noise of Alice is properly quantified
using Eq. (8). We calculate the secure key as a function
of the channel length using experimentally determined
system parameters. Here, we assume the quantum chan-
nel is a single mode fiber with an attenuation coefficient
of γ = 0.2dB/km. As shown in Fig. 8, a practical dis-
FIG. 6: Raw data of Alice and Bob’s X-quadrature
measurement results (n0 = 900 and ηtot = −42.2dB).
FIG. 7: The correlation coefficient of Alice and Bob’s
X-quadrature measurement results as a function of
optical attenuation ηtot = η0T . Blue dots represent
experimental results (error bars represent one standard
deviation). The red line is a fit curve based on Eq. (13)
by replacing ηbx with by ηtotηbx.
tance above 80km could be achieved. The QKD distance
could be further extended by improving the mode overlap
factor a. Details of the secure key formulas are summa-
rized in Appendix B.
To compare the simulated secure key rates with the
experimental results shown in Fig. 7, we use Eq. (A11)
in Appendix A to determine the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob from the experimentally determined
correlation coefficient as IAB = log2
(
1
1− Corr2
)
. Two
7FIG. 8: The secure key rate as a function of channel
loss. Simulation parameters: a = 0.96, n0=900,
ηax = 0.43, ηap = 0.38, ηbx = 0.54, ηbp = 0.51,
υax = 0.17, υap = 0.19, υbx = 0.24, υap = 0.23. The
efficiency of the reconciliation algorithm is f = 0.95 (see
details in Appendix B). The two data points are secure
key rates calculated using the experimental results
shown in Fig. 7 (error bars are determined by one
standard deviation of the correlation coefficient).
data points shown in Fig. 7, corresponding to ηtot =
−32.1dB and −42.2dB, are used in the calculation. Since
only one attenuator is applied in the experiment, we
artificially divide the total attenuation ηtot into Alice’s
attenuation η0 and channel transmittance T as {η0 =
0.0009, T = 0.69} (for ηtot = −32.1dB) and {η0 =
0.0004, T = 0.15} (for ηtot = −42.2dB). The calculated
secure key rates are shown in Fig. 8 as two points, with
error bars determined by one standard deviation of the
correlation coefficient.
V. SUMMARY
One common question on the passive CV-QKD scheme
is whether we can trust the randomness from a thermal
source. It is a common practice to apply a quantum ran-
dom number generator [38, 39] in prepare-and-measure
QKD for state preparation and/or measurement basis se-
lection. As we have discussed in [34], while quantum
randomness is ultimately connected to quantum super-
position states, in the fully trusted device scenario, the
quantum state received by the detector does not need to
be a pure state. One illustrative example is the first quan-
tum random number generator, where electrons from a
radioactive source such as 90Sr are detected by a Geiger
Mueller tube at random times [40, 41]. In this process,
while the whole system (the radioactive nuclei and elec-
trons) is in pure state, the state received by the detector
is a mixture of 0-electron and 1-electron emission states.
True randomness can be generated as long as Eve cannot
access (or control) the radioactive source. Similar argu-
ments can also be applied to randomness generated from
spontaneous emission using a thermal source.
The security of QKD is only as good as its underlying
assumptions [42]. In this paper, we have adopted a com-
monly used assumption in QKD that the QKD systems
employed by Alice and Bob are fully trusted and can-
not be accessed by Eve. In practice, any real-life QKD
systems cannot be perfect. It is thus important to scruti-
nize all of the implementation details to identify potential
side channels and develop the corresponding countermea-
sures. The investigation of loopholes and countermea-
sures in practical QKD systems plays a complementary
role to security proofs.
In summary, we conduct experimental studies on the
recently proposed passive CV-QKD protocol [22], which
is appealing for chip-scale implementation. When imple-
mented with a practical multi-mode thermal source, one
important issue is how to determine the excess noise con-
tributed by photons in the unwanted modes. In this pa-
per, we develop a noise model based on a practical setup,
and conduct experiments to verify the above model using
a commercial off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emis-
sion source. Our results suggest that passive CV-QKD
could be a cost-effective solution for metro-area QKD.
This work was performed at Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory (ORNL), operated by UT-Battelle for the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) under Contract No. DE-
AC05-00OR22725. The authors acknowledge support
from DOE Office of Cybersecurity Energy Security and
Emergency Responce (CESER) through the Cybersecu-
rity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program.
Appendix A: Detailed noise model analysis
In this appendix, we present a detailed noise model of
the passive CV-QKD scheme taking into account imper-
fections of practical homodyne detectors. To gain some
intuition on its security, we also study the well-known
beam-splitting attack where Eve replaces the lossy quan-
tum channel by a beam splitter with a suitable trans-
mittance and measures both the X-quadrature and P-
quadrature of the reflected light, as shown in Fig. 9. Note
that in our model, we assume Eve’s detectors are perfect
while Alice and Bob’s detectors are lossy and noisy.
For simplicity, we only consider the X-quadrature be-
low. The P-quadrature can be studied in a similar way.
The X-quadrature of the optical mode output from Alice
(see Fig. 9) is given by
x1 =
√
η0
2
xin −
√
η0
2
xv1 −
√
1− η0xv3, (A1)
where xin is the X-quadrature of the output of the source,
η0 is the transmittance of the optical attenuator, xv1 and
xv3 represent vacuum noises introduced by beam splitter
one and the optical attenuator, respectively (see Fig. 9).
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FIG. 9: Detailed noise model under the beam-splitting
attack. S, thermal source; BS1−4, balanced beam
splitter; Att, optical attenuator; HD, homodyne
detector; T, a beam splitter emulating channel loss; ηax,
ηbx, ηap, ηbp, beam splitters emulating losses of
homodyne detectors.
Note the variance of vacuum noise is one in shot noise
units, i.e., 〈x2v1〉 = 〈x2v3〉 = 1.
Given the source outputs a thermal state with an av-
erage photon number of n0, it is easy to show that the
outgoing mode from Alice is also a thermal state with
an average photon number of η0n0/2. The output state
from Alice in the passive CV-QKD is identical to that of
GMCS QKD using active modulation with a modulation
variance of
VA = η0n0. (A2)
As we discussed in Sec. II, the secure key rate of CV-
QKD is sensitive to excess noises. It is thus important
to quantify how much excess noise is introduced by the
passive state preparation scheme.
As shown in Fig. 9, Alice splits the output of the
source into two modes using a balanced beam splitter,
and measures the X-quadrature and P-quadrature of the
local mode. Alice’s X-quadrature measurement result is
x2 =
√
ηax
2
xin +
√
ηax
2
xv1
+
√
ηax
2
xv2 −
√
1− ηaxxva + Eax,
(A3)
where ηax and Eax are the efficiency and noise of Alice’s
homodyne detector for X-quadrature measurement, xv2
and xva are vacuum noises associated with beam splitter
two and ηax.
Given x2, Alice’s optimal estimation of x1 is xopt =
α0x2, where α0 = 〈x1x2〉/〈x22〉 [30, 31].
Using Eqs. (A1) and (A3), we can determine α0 as
α0 =
n0
√
2η0ηax
n0ηax + 2υax + 2
. (A4)
In the above derivation, we define the detector noise
variance as υax = 〈E2ax〉. We also used the relation of
〈x2in〉 = 2n0 + 1, which is true for a thermal state.
Alice’s uncertainty on x1 given her measurement re-
sult of x2 is ∆ = Vx1|x2 = 〈(x1 − α0x2)2〉. Using Eqs.
(A1) to (A4), we can determine the excess noise of state
preparation as
εA = ∆− 1 = 2VA(υax + 1)
VAηax + 2η0(υax + 1)
η0. (A5)
Equation (A5) suggests that the excess noise of the
passive state preparation scheme can be effectively re-
duced by introducing large optical attenuation at Alice
(i.e. η0 << 1). Note to keep a desired variance VA of the
outgoing mode, a large n0 is required from the source to
compensate a small η0.
To further illustrate the role of the optical attenuation,
we calculate the mutual information between Alice and
Bob (IAB), and the one between Eve and Bob (IBE),
under the beam-splitting attack. We emphasis that in
this paper, we consider the CV-QKD protocol using het-
erodyne detection and reverse reconciliation, where Bob
measures both the X-quadrature and P-quadrature of the
incoming mode, and Alice tries to guess Bob’s measure-
ment results from her data. This is in contrast to the
direct reconciliation protocol where Bob tries to deter-
mine Alice’s data.
As shown in Fig. 9, a lossy channel with a transmit-
tance of T can be modeled by a beam splitter with an
appropriate splitting ratio. In the beam splitting attack,
the transmitted and reflected mode are detected by Bob
and Eve respectively.
From Fig. 9, Bob’s X-quadrature measurement result
is given by
x3 =
√
η0Tηbx
2
xin −
√
η0Tηbx
2
xv1 −
√
(1− η0)Tηbx
2
xv3
−
√
(1− T )ηbx
2
xv4 +
√
ηbx
2
xv5 −
√
1− ηbxxvb + Ebx,
(A6)
where ηbx and Ebx are the efficiency and noise of Bob’s
homodyne detector for X-quadrature measurement, xvb
represents vacuum noise associated ηbx, vacuum noises
introduced by other components are shown in Fig. 9.
Similarly, Eve’s X-quadrature measurement result is
given by
x4 =
√
η0(1− T )
2
xin −
√
η0(1− T )
2
xv1
−
√
(1− η0)(1− T )
2
xv3 +
√
T
2
xv4 +
1√
2
xv6,
(A7)
In reverse reconciliation, Alice tries to guess Bob’s
measurement result x3 given her own measurement re-
sult x2. Alice’s optimal estimation of x3 is xA = α1x2,
where α1 = 〈x3x2〉/〈x22〉. From Eqs. (A3) and (A6), Al-
ice’s conditional variance on Bob’s measurement result
9VB|A can be determined as:
VB|A = 〈(x3 − α1x2)2〉 = 〈x23〉 −
〈x2x3〉2
〈x22〉
=
VATηbx(υax + 1)
ηax
η0
VA + 2υax + 2
+ υbx + 1.
(A8)
Since secure key could be generated from both X and
P, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is given
by
IAB = log2
(
VB
VB|A
)
, (A9)
where Bob’s X-quadrature variance VB is given by
VB = 〈x23〉 =
VATηbx
2
+ υbx + 1. (A10)
Note that by using Eqs. (A8) and (A10), we can write
Eq. (A9) as
IAB = log2
(
1
1− Corr2
)
, (A11)
where Corr = 〈x2x3〉√〈x22〉〈x23〉 is the correlation coefficient. Eq.
(A11) allows us to use the experimentally determined
correlation coefficient to estimate the mutual information
between Alice and Bob.
Following a similar procedure, Eve’s conditional vari-
ance on Bob’s measurement result and the mutual infor-
mation between Eve and Bob can be determined as:
VB|E =
VATηbx
VA(1− T ) + 2 + υbx + 1, (A12)
and
IBE = log2
(
VB
VB|E
)
. (A13)
From Eqs. (A8) to (A13), for a given VA, we can effec-
tively suppress VB|A and thus increase IAB by reducing
the value of η0. In contrast, IBE is independent of the
value of η0. This shows the information advantage be-
tween Alice and Bob over that between Eve and Bob can
be improved by introducing optical loss at Alice.
In principle, secure key could be generated as long as
VB|A < VB|E . The corresponding constraint on η0 can
be determined from Eqs. (A8) and (A12) as
η0 <
ηax
(υax + 1)(1− T ) . (A14)
Appendix B: Secure key rate calculation
The asymptotic secure key rate of GMCS QKD, in the
case of reverse reconciliation, is given by Refs. [16, 43]
R = fIAB − χBE , (B1)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation
algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound on information be-
tween Eve and Bob.
For an optical fiber link with an attenuation coefficient
of γ, the channel transmittance is given by
T = 10
−γL
10 , (B2)
where L is the fiber length in kilometers.
In the case of conjugate homodyne detection, the X-
quadrature noise added by Bob’s detector (referred to
Bob’s input) is given by [43]
χhet = [1 + (1− ηbx) + 2υbx]/ηbx. (B3)
The channel-added noise (referred to the channel in-
put) is given by
χline =
1
T
− 1 + εA, (B4)
where εA is defined in Eq. (8) in the main text.
The overall noise is given by
χtot = χline +
χhet
T
. (B5)
Since both quadratures can be used to generate secure
key, the mutual information between Alice and Bob can
be determined by
IAB = log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
, (B6)
where V = VA + 1.
To estimate χBE , we assume that Eve cannot control
the imperfections in Bob’s system. This noise model has
been widely used in CV-QKD experiments [9, 12, 16–20].
Under this model, the Holevo bound of the information
between Eve and Bob is given by [16]
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
, (B7)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x.
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
, (B8)
where
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2, (B9)
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2. (B10)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
, (B11)
where
C =
1
(T (V + χtot))2
[Aχ2het +B + 1 + 2χhet
(V
√
B + T (V + χline)) + 2T (V
2 − 1)],
(B12)
10
D =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T (V + χtot)
)2
. (B13)
λ5 = 1. (B14)
We remark that in this paper, all the excess noise gen-
erated at Alice are assumed to be caused by Eve’s attack.
This is a very conservative assumption. An alternative
way to deal with the excess noise is to develop a suitable
“trusted” noise model [44], which may lead to a better
secure key rate.
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